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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utan Supreme Court assigned this case to 
the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition on June 12, 1989 
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2) (h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Special Verdict and 
Judgment in favor of the Defendants in the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Should the Special Verdict and resulting Judgment 
in favor of Michael Lahey, M.D. ("Dr. Lahey") be affirmed 
where; 
1. No evidence was introduced at trial to 
establish the standard of care applicable to Dr. Lahey, any 
breach of that standard, and any injury which such breach 
may have caused; 
2. The jury found that there was no negligence on 
the part of Dr. Lahey; 
3. No party asked for a new trial with respect to 
-1-
the claim against Dr. Lahey; 
4. No party has challenged the Judgment in favor 
of Dr. Lahey on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages which Plaintiff 
claims to have sustained as a result of the alleged 
professional negligence of L.D.S. Hospital, Kimball Lloyd, 
M.D. (Dr. Lloyd), and Dr. Lahey in providing health care 
services for Betty George. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case was tried before Judge Pat B. Brian with 
a jury between October 31, 1988 and November 9, 1988. The 
jury returned a Special Verdict in favor of the Defendants 
on November 9, 1988. Plaintiff moved for a New Trial or 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict; the Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict was subsequently 
withdrawn. Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial was heard and 
denied on January 27, 1989. The final Judgment of the 
District Court was entered on March 2, 1989; Plaintiff's 
-2-
Notice of Appeal was filed on March 31, 1989. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Judgment of the District Court held as follows: 
1. L.D.S. Hospital through its nursing staff 
and/or respiratory therapists was negligent in the care of 
Betty George. 
2. The negligence of L.D.S. Hospital was not a 
proximate cause of death of Betty George and the damages 
claimed by Plaintiff. 
3. Dr. Lloyd was not negligent in his care of 
Betty George. 
4. Dr. Lahey was not negligent in his care of 
Betty George. 
D. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The relevant facts giving rise to the case are as 
follows: 
1. Betty George was hospitalized at L.D.S. 
Hospital commencing on June 28, 1986 for an abdominal 
hysterectomy and exploratory surgery relative to an internal 
mass and Defendants provided health care services to her. 
(Plaintifffs Complaint, Par. 11-17, R. 4-5; Answer of 
-3-
Michael Lahey, M.D. (Par. 6, R. 27.) 
2. Surgery was performed on July 29, 1986. An 
abdominal mass was located and removed and found to be a 
benign cyst. (Plaintiff's Complaint, Par. 13, R. 3-4.) 
3. Subsequent to the surgery, Dr. Lahey 
provided health care services to Betty George as an internal 
medicine consultant. (Plaintiff's Complaint, Par. 14 R. 5; 
Answer of Michael Lahey, M.D., Par. 6, R. 27.) 
4. On August 2, 1986, Betty George suffered a 
cardiac arrest and subsequently died on August 4, 1986. 
(Plaintiff's Complaint, Par. 16 and 17, R. 27); Answer of 
Michael Lahey, M.D. Par. 5, R. 27.) 
5. Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Lahey violated the 
applicable standard of care and that as a proximate result 
of this conduct Betty George suffered a cardiac arrest and 
subsequent death which resulted in injuries and damage to 
Plaintiff. (Plaintiff's Complaint, Par. 26 and 27, R. 8-9.) 
6. No evidence was introduced at trial as to the 
standard of care applicable to Dr. Lahey, breach of the 
standard of care, or causation. (R. 764-768.) 
7. The Special Verdict of the jury found that Dr. 
Lahey was not negligent in his care of Betty George. (R. 
397; Special Verdict - Addendum "A".) 
-4-
8. Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial did not 
challenge the Special Verdict and Judgment in favor of Dr. 
Lahey. (R. 638, 653; Motion for New Trial and Affidavit of 
Counsel for Plaintiff - Addendum ,fB".) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Special Verdict and Judgment finding Dr. Lahey 
not guilty of negligence must be affirmed as no evidence was 
produced at trial as to the standard of care applicable to 
Dr. Lahey, breach of the standard of care, or causation. 
Further, no party has challenged the appropriateness of the 
Special Verdict and Judgment as to Dr. Lahey. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT AND RESULTING 
JUDGMENT FINDING NO NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF MICHAEL LAHEY, M.D. 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
At the close of LDS Hospital's case, Plaintiff 
moved for a directed virdict in favor of Dr. Lahey, and Dr. 
Lloyd. The District Court denied the Motion and included on 
the Special Verdict form question 2(a), which asked whether 
Dr. Lahey was negligent in his care of Betty George. The 
-5-
jury found that Dr. Lahey was not negligent. 
The Special Verdict and Judgment in favor of Dr. 
Lahey does not merit further consideration by this Court 
because no evidence or testimony was produced at trial as to 
the standard of care applicable to Dr. Lahey, breach of the 
standard of care, or causation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that in a 
medical malpractice action, plaintiff usually must provide 
expert testimony establishing the standard of care or duty 
owed by the physician, that the physician failed to comply 
with the standard and that such conduct caused damage. The 
only exception is where the type of malpractice committed is 
within the common knowledge and experience of lay people. 
Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337 (Utah App. 1987), Nixdorf v. 
Hicken, 712 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980), Fredrickson v. Maw, 227 
P.2d 772 (Utah 1951). 
During the course of the trial, no witness, expert 
or otherwise, testified regarding the standard of care 
applicable to Dr. Lahey or that there was any improper 
conduct on his part. The determination of the jury and the 
Court that there was no negligence on Dr. Laheyfs part was 
the only possible outcome. 
-6-
II. 
NO CHALLENGE HAS BEEN RAISED TO THE 
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE SPECIAL 
VERDICT AND RESULTING JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF MICHAEL LAHEY, M.D. 
As can be seen from the Motion for New Trial 
(Addendum "B"), and the Briefs filed by Plaintiff and L.D.S. 
Hospital, no party has challenged the appropriateness of the 
Special Verdict and resulting Judgment in favor of Dr. 
Lahey. 
CONCLUSION 
The Special Verdict and resulting Judgment in favor 
of Dr. Lahey was the only possible factual and legal 
determination and they have not been challenged in the 
District Court or this Court. The Judgment in favor of Dr. 
Lahey should be affirmed. 
-7-
Respectfully submitted this *•>-'*— day of November, 
1989-
PP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
ANTHONY EYRE 
MICHAEL F. SKOLNICK 
Attorneys for Defendan\/-
Respondent Michael 
Lahey, M.D. 
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ADDENDA 
Tab A 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, et al. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL 
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. C-87-4199 
Judge Pat Brian 
At the end of each proposition submitted to you, indicate 
your finding by placing an "X" in the appropriate line. If 
there is preponderance of the evidence in favor of the 
proposition, indicate by finding "yes." If there is 
preponderance of the evidence against the proposition, indicate 
by finding "no." If there is no preponderance of the evidence 
either way on the proposition, indicate by answering "no." 
We, the jury in this action, find the answers to the 
questions propounded to us, as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1 
A. Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER: Y e s No ,A 
OOOQO 
B. If you answered "yes" to question No. 3A above, then 
and only then answer the following question: Was the negligence 
of Dr. Kimball Lloyd a proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George and the damages claimad by David George and the heirs of 
Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO. 2 
A. Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of Betty 
George? 
ANSWER: Yes No •** 
B. If you answered "yes" to question No. 2A above, then 
and only then answer the following question: Was the negligence 
of Dr. Michael Lahey a proximate cause of the death of Betty 
George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of 
Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No._ 
QUESTION NO. 3 
A. Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or 
respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes *X No 
B. If you answered "yes" to No. 3A above, then answer 
the following question: Was the negligence of LDS Hospital 
including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory therapists, a 
-2-
nooo 
proximate cause of the death of Betty George and Jie damages claiired by 
David George and the heirs of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No »\ 
If you answered lfno,f to question 3A or 3B, or if you found no 
preponderance of the evidence either way, then answer no further questions. 
QUESTION NO. 4 
What is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by David George, 
and the heirs of Betty George and the estate of Betty George? Tnis question 
should be answered only if you answered Myes,f to question No. 3A and 3B. 
General Damages 
a. Loss of consortium $ 
b. Pain and suffering of Betty George $ 
Special Damages including: 
a. FUneral and Burial expenses $ 
b. Medical expenses $ 
c. Lost income, benefits and household services $ 
QUESTION NO. 5 
Assessing a percentage only to a party or parties found negligent, 
considering the negligence to amount to 100 percent, what percentage of 
negligence is attributed to: 
a. Dr. Kimball Iloyd % 
b. Dr. Michael Lahey % 
c. LDS Hospital, its nurses 
ancVor respiratory therapists 
% 
Total 100 % 
- 3 -
Oonoog 
Dated t h i s 2 day of Aht-m^f . 1988. 
IFoREPERSON JURY FOREPE
_4_ 
0OO400 
David George aid the heirs of Betty George? 
ANSWER: Yes No »\ 
If you answered "no" to question 37v or 3B, or if you found no 
preponderance of the evidence either way, then answer no further questions, 
QUESTION HO. 4 
Wliat is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by David George, 
and the heirs of Betty George and the estate of Betty George? This question 
should be answered only if you answered "yes" to question No. 3A and 3B. 
General Damages 
a. Loss of consortium $ 
b. Pain and suffering of Betty George $ 
Special Damages including: 
a. Funeral and Burial expenses $ 
b. Medical expenses $ 
c. Lost income, benefits and household services $ 
QUESTION NO. 5 
Assessing a percentage only to a party or parties found negligent, 
considering the negligence to amount to 100 percent, wliat percentage of 
negligence is attributed to: 
a. Dr. Kimball Lloyd % 
b. Dr. Michael Lahey % 
c. LDS Hospital, its nurses 
anchor respiratory therapists 
% 
Total 100 % 
-3-
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Steve Russell (A2831) 
Kathryn Collard (0697) 
COLLARD & RUSSELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
415 Judge Building 
#8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-1664 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, 
v. 
LDS HOSPITAL, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT - OR FOR A NEW 
TRIAL 
C i v i l No. C-87-4199 
Judge Pat Brian 
Plaintiff, by and through counsel, hereby moves the Court to 
enter a Judgment in plaintiff's favor, Notwithstanding the Verdict 
in the above-entitled case, pursuant to Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
This Motion is supported by the accompanying Affidavit of 
plaintiff's Trial Counsel, and Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities. 
Dated this M day of iVpVembt-*- , 1988. 
COLLARD & RUSSELL 
ZJUi /a**-
Attorney for Plaintiff 
0^ 
Steve Russell (A2831) 
Kathryn Collard (0697) 
COLLARD & RUSSELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
415 Judge Building 
#8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 534-1664 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID GEORGE, I AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Civil No. C-87-4199 
LDS HOSPITAL, 
J Judge Pat Brian 
Defendants. I 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
STEVE RUSSELL and KATHRYN COLLARD, being first duly sworn, 
depose and state: 
1. That we are legal counsel for the plaintiff in the 
above-entitled matter, and were counsel in the trial of the case 
which concluded on November 9, 1988. 
2. That plaintiff's "theory of the case" was simple and 
straight forward, to wit: The negligence of the LDS hospital 
employees caused, contributed to the cause, or was a substantial 
factor in the cause of Betty George's increasing respiratory 
complications during her hospitalization; and further that the 
nn^n 
negligence of LDS Hospital on the afternoon of August 2, 1986 
deprived Mrs. George of the opportunity of being diagnosed and 
treated by competent physicians, thereby causing, or contributing 
to the cause of her arrest that evening, followed by an 
irreversible coma and subsequent death on August 4, 1986. 
3. In plaintiff's theory of the case, it didn't matter 
what specific mechanism (i.e., hypoxia, sepsis, snakebite) caused 
the arrest. Plaintiff's case against LDS Hospital was premised on 
the failure of the patient to receive necessary medical attention. 
Plaintiff's duty in a medical malpractice is to prove that the 
negligence (that is, the acts and omissions), of the hospital is 
causally connected to the plaintiff's injuries and damage. 
Plaintiff's burden in this regard was correctly set forth in Jury 
Instructions 16 and 21. 
4. If a patient needs diagnosis and treatment in order 
to prevent or lessen the severity of a life-threatening 
complication, and such diagnosis and treatment is not provided due 
to the negligence of medical personnel responsible to report the 
patient's condition - then it naturally follows that a jury could 
find that such negligence caused or contributed to the cause of 
the patient's injury regardless of the specific illness or 
condition in question. 
5. Plaintiff produced the only competent expert 
testimony on the negligence of the hospital nurses and respiratory 
therapists from Harriet Gillerman, R.N., and Don Owings, R.T. 
nn^R 
6. The jury found that LDS Hospital was negligent. 
[Special Verdict, Question 3A.] 
7. Nurse Gillerman and Mr. Owings also testified, or at 
least attempted to testify that the negligence of the LDS hospital 
staff caused or contributed to the arrest suffered by Mrs. George, 
by failing to report significant changes in her condition to 
appropriate medical personnel including Mrs. George's treating 
physicians. The basis for their opinion was the obvious fact that 
Mrs. George had not received the attention of a competent 
physician when needed. 
In any event/ a jury does not need expert testimony to link 
the negligent failure to procure necessary medical diagnosis and 
treatment with a subsequent complication. 
8. There was a great deal of commotion, interruption 
and argument focused on the competence of plaintiff's experts to 
offer an opinion on the specific mechanism or condition which 
caused Mrs. George's death. Such was not the purpose of their 
testimony. 
9. The undersigned assert that the matter of the 
competence of plaintiff's experts was given undue attention, was 
improperly brought into question, and that the Court's rulings on 
the issue were unclear and confusing enough to cast doubt on the 
credibility and weight to be accorded the testimony of plaintiff's 
experts. (This confusion and uncertainty was later fatally 
compounded by the giving of Instruction 21A, as discussed below.) 
on°ft4Q 
10. In fact, the opinions of plaintiff's experts were 
subsequently confirmed by every physician who appeared in the 
case. Dr. Lloyd, Dr. Lahey, Dr. Trowbridge, Dr. Weinstein and Dr. 
Elliot, all testified that Mrs. George's condition on August 2 
mandated that the hospital staff assure that she was seen by a 
physician for diagnosis and treatment. Defendant's so-called 
infectious disease experts all detailed numerous ways in which 
"sepsis" is treated, and testified that the vast majority of their 
septic patients do not arrest and die. 
11. Though the infection experts, based on a 
retrospective examination of the record alone, described Mrs. 
George's "sepsis" with varying degrees of incredible severity, 
none of them stated any specific point in time after which 
diagnosis and treatment by a competent M.D. would have been 
futile. The testimony of all of the physician witnesses 
supported the natural conclusion or inference that the negligence 
of the hospital was a proximate cause of the patient's arrest and 
subsequent death. 
12. While the experts were willing to say that silly 
things like deep breathing would not have prevented the result, 
none of them said that the full panoply of interventions in a 
properly equipped and staffed ICU, which they all use and are 
familiar with, would not have been enough. 
13. As it was, defendant's infectious disease experts 
were allowed to testify on the basis of total and complete 
on°^ 
speculation. The basis for each of their opinions was that Mrs. 
George was overwhelmingly and unbelievably sick, yet the testimony 
of the physicians and other medical personnel who were actually 
with Betty George on August 2nd completely contradicted the 
premise of their opinions. Plaintiff's repeated objections to the 
absolutely speculative (and contrary to the evidence) testimony of 
the hospital's experts were overruled by the Court. 
14. While plaintiff's experts were denied the chance to 
render opinions and conclusions within the field of their training 
and experience, and which hardly could be said to require 
expertise (i.e. if a patient needs help and it's not provided the 
patient's condition will get worse); the hospital's experts were 
allowed to journey into the farthest regions of speculation and 
conjecture, to say that things never done would not have made a 
difference, and to base their opinions on assumptions which were 
patently untrue. All of this, solely on the basis that they have 
the privilege of appending their name with the initials "M.D." 
15. The "cause of death" of Betty George was a focal 
point of numerous arguments before the Court at the bench, in 
chambers, and in open Court. 
16. On at least three occasions, probably more, the 
Court stated that the ultimate medical cause of death was "not in 
issue" or that it was "irrelevant to the plaintiff's case" - which 
was true. 
on<-^*2 
17. That position was last restated during the lunch 
break on the last day of trial. At that time, the fact that LDS 
Hospital intended to ground its entire defense on the "it didn't 
matter what we did" theory was completely obvious, particularly 
given the entirely speculative and inconclusive testimony of Dr. 
Elliot. 
18. The principal matter discussed during that break 
was the propriety of an instruction posed by defendant which was 
later given as instruction 21A. 
19. This instruction had to be added to those which had 
previously been discussed and agreed to by respective counsel with 
the Court. 
20. It is plaintiff's counsel's recollection that the 
instruction had previously fceen rejected because of the Court's 
opinion that it x&s irrelevant. rsee. plaintiff's worksheet 
dealing with the proposed Instruction attached as EXHIBIT 2.] 
During the afternoon break, after the interchange described above, 
and when it appeared that the Court intended to give the 
instruction anyway, plaintiff's counsel again inquired as to the 
purpose of instructing the jury that plaintiff had the burden to 
prove an irrelevant issue, particularly when plaintiff's burden to 
prove proximate cause was set forth in a number of other proper 
instructions. The inquiry did not elicit a response from the 
Court. 
21. Jury Instruction 21A read: 
on° 
You are instructed that where the proximate cause 
of Betty George's death and therefore the injury 
or loss claimed by the plaintiff is not established 
by a preponderance of the evidence based on a 
reasonable degree of medical probability from the 
testimony of a medical doctor, but is left to 
conjecture or speculation and may reasonably be 
attributed to causes over which the hospital or 
doctor had no control or responsibility, then 
the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of 
proof as to proximate cause. (Emphasis added.) 
21A. Jury Instruction 21A requires plaintiff to prove 
"the proximate cause of death." It is therefore an incorrect 
statement of the law, and directly contradicts Jury Instruction 
21, which correctly states that, "There may be more than one 
proximate cause for an injury." 
22. Jury Instruction 21A required the plaintiff to 
prove "the cause of death" - an issue which the Court had 
repeatedly and correctly stated was "not in issue" or "irrelevant" 
in order for the plaintiff to prevail. 
23 Jury Instruction 21A established an impossibility at 
the time it was approved by the Court, by requiring that the 
testimony be from a medical doctor. The entire trial was about a 
hospital and its nurses and respiratory therapists. Those 
individuals are best qualified to testify about standard of care, 
breach and the result of such a breach by nurses and respiratory 
therapists. Plaintiff satisfied its burden with competent 
testimony that the "overwhelming" (to borrow a term) negligence of 
the hospital was a proximate cause of Betty George's arrest, from 
which her death inevitably ensued. 
on^tf*4 
Instruction 21A prohibited the jury from considering the 
competent testimony of Harriet Gillerman and Don Owings as to the 
causal connection between the negligence of LDS Hospital and the 
arrest and subsequent death, because those witnesses were not 
M.D.'s. 
24. The issue of "reasonable degree of medical 
probability" was followed with interest, and later consternation-, 
by plaintiff's counsel. It appeared from the Court's rulings, 
that the Court believed that a nurse with 25 years of impeccable 
qualifications and credentials was incapable of speaking with any 
degree of medical probability, and yet the pronouncements of an 
M.D. were automatically imbued with a reasonable degree of medical 
probability. 
25. At no time did any of defendants "experts" 
quantify in any respect what degree of medical probability 
attached to their opinions, nor why anyone except them would 
consider their opinions more probable than anything else. 
Nevertheless, it was routinely sufficient for a witness like Dr. 
Elliot to- answer "yes" to the question: "Is your opinion based on 
a reasonable degree of medical probability?" (as if the term was 
commonly understood) , in order to be elevated in status and 
weight. 
26. Plaintiff was entitled to have his theory of the 
case put to the jury in the form of instructions from the Court. 
27. In the numerous discussions with the Court, 
00° 
including the one on the last day of trial, it was pointed out 
that, not only would an instruction like 21A require plaintiff to 
prove an irrelevant issue to prevail, but that it would provide 
the defendant hospital with a defense which could be relied on to 
confuse and mislead the jury. 
28. Jury Instruction 21A was completely contrary to 
plaintiff's theory of the case. 
29. At the same time, Jury Instruction 21A provided the 
defense with a position based on an irrelevant issue which was 
later relied on almost exclusively as a means to avoid liability. 
30. Sure enough, defense counsel in closing employed 
the famous, "You can't get there from here" theory to argue that 
jbecause the patient died of sepsis, which was not the result of 
any negligence attributable to the hospital, plaintiff could not 
recover. 
31. Defense counsel's argument on the causation 
question focused exclusively on the plaintiff's irrelevant burden 
set forth in 21A. The instruction was re-read by defense counsel 
and referred to continually in closing argument-. 
32. On November LO ~aird"~16, 1988. plaintiff's counsel 
contacted the jury foremen, Mr. Ralph smith, to determine the 
basis for the jury's decision. Mr. Smith"indicated that the issue 
of the hospital's negligence was "the easiest question the jury 
had, and the only one all the jurors readily agreed on." Mr. 
Smith further stated that the jury's deliberations on causation 
on 
were focused entirely on the requirement set forth in Instruction 
21A, which resulted in the jury's negative answer to Question 3B 
on the Jury Verdict Form. rsee. the AFFIDAVIT OF RALPH SMITH, 
attached.] 
33. It is the opinion of plaintiff's counsel that the 
inclusion of Instruction 21A was plain error, ami that it was 
prejudicial in the extreme. It is further the opinion of 
plaintiff's counsel that this error was compounded in at least two 
very critical respects. 
34. First, it was plain error to include any reference 
to Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey in the jury instructions or the Special 
Verdict form. 
35. No witness, expert or otherwise said one word about 
the standard of care applicable to Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey. 
36. No witness, expert or otherwise, stated that Dr. 
Lloyd or Dr. Lahey had violated the unknown standard of care in 
any respect. 
37. The Court indicated during the lunch break of the 
last day of trial that the jury might infer that the doctors 
should have diagnosed an infection in the patient. The making of 
such an inference, even if there was testimony to support it, 
which testimony was not heard by the undersigned counsel, is 
absolutely prohibited in a medical malpractice case. This is 
particularly true when the jury would first have to speculate on 
n r\ r\ 
what the standard of care required, before it could speculate on 
whether it was breached, 
38. No M.D. testified with any degree of medical 
certainty how Drs. Lloyd and Lahey breached the undefined standard 
of care, what the standard of care required them to do instead, or 
what the proximate cause of the non-existent breach of the unknown 
standard was. 
39. The jury was specifically instructed not to 
speculate with respect to these matters involving Dr. Lloyd and 
Dr. Lahey in instructions 22, 29 and 30. The jury was then 
required to speculate as to Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey on the 
Special Verdict Form. 
40. The jury correctly determined that there was no 
evidence to support a finding of negligence against the physician 
defendants. 
The point here being, while the jury was allowed to 
speculate about the physician defendants, Instruction 21A 
prohibited the jury from considering competent evidence that the 
clear negligence of the hospital was causally connected to the 
plaintiff's injuries and damage. 
41. The error inherent in the giving of Jury 
Instruction 21A was further compounded by time limitations being 
placed on plaintiff's counsel's closing argument, and particularly 
by the denial of the plaintiff's right to rebut the closing 
argument of defense counsel. 
on 
42. During the first week of trial, counsel was asked 
to estimate the time that would be needed for closing argument. 
Plaintiff's counsel indicated 75-90 minutes. The Court allowed 
plaintiff's counsel to split his argument, and thereafter, counsel 
made efforts to structure an argument within those limits. 
43. On the last day of trial three events occurred 
which dramatically altered what was needed to be accomplished in 
closing. Those were: 
a. The Court's denial of plaintiff's Motion for a 
Directed Verdict as to Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey; 
b. The rather incredible testimony of Dr. Elliot, 
who was apparently prepared to irrevocably seal the fate of Betty 
George as of sometime on July 30, 1986; and 
c. The inclusion of Instruction 21A, together with 
the fact that it was obvious the hospital would rely on it 
exclusively in an attempt to avoid liability. 
44. During counsel's closing argument an error in the 
Special Verdict form became apparent- (That having to do with the 
right of the plaintiff to recover damages for the estate of Betty 
George pursuant to §78-11-12, U.C.A.) 
45. In a subsequent meeting in chambers the error was 
corrected, but the Court advised that counsel would h&fa only 5 
minutes to complete his argument. Worse, the Court inTiiQated in 
the presence of defense counsel that no rebuttal would be allowed. 
n<* 
46. The undersigned acknowledges that 90 minutes had 
been taken in argument, and that the 5 minutes allowed by the 
Court probably meant that plaintiff's argument exceeded 90 
minutes. 
47. However, at the time the Court limited plaintiff's 
argument, plaintiff's counsel had 20-30 minutes left of planned 
argument including several extremely important points, such as: 
a. The role of the second year resident Carol 
Adams, (which portion of the argument had to be omitted.); 
b. The plaintiff's position, supported by 
competent expert testimony, that the knowledge of Adams, whatever 
it was, did not excuse the continuing failure of the LDS Hospital 
staff to make sure the true condition of Betty George was made 
known to a competent physician, along with the nurses unqualified 
request that diagnosis and treatment be immediately initiated; 
c. Further argument that the testimony of 
defendant's experts was entirely speculative and untrustworthy; 
but even if believed was not inconsistent with plaintiff's theory 
that the failure of the hospital staff was a proximate cause of 
the arrest since it deprived the patient of having any chance of 
having her sepsis (assuming its existence) diagnosed and treated 
before it was too late; and 
d. almost all of plaintiff's argument as to the 
damage issues. 
on 
48. The undersigned counsel further contend that the 
denial of plaintiff1s right to rebut the defense argument put 
defense counsel in the position of taking a "free swing" with the 
knowledge that errors and false statements would not be subject to 
correction• 
49. Defense counsel took full advantage of the 
situation by knowingly making false and inflammatory statements 
with respect to the non-appearance of a critical witness (Nurse 
Soraghan); by knowingly making false and inflammatory statements 
about the settlement plaintiff had previously negotiated with Drs. 
Lloyd and Lahey; and by hammering at the notion that because some 
experts had made an after-the-fact diagnosis of sepsis as being 
the cause of death, that the hospital's failure to see that the 
patient received necessary medical attention was somehow excused. 
This argument was based entirely on the authority of Instruction 
21A. 
50. Plaintiff's inability to rebut the closing argument 
of defendant constituted the unnecessary denial of a fundamental 
right and was prejudicial to plaintiff in the extreme. 
51. Based on all of the above, as well as the 
accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and the 
Affidavit of Ralph Smith, plaintiff requests that the Court enter 
a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict in his favor, or, in the 
alternative, a New Trial. 
Dated this e& day of Ntl/MV^ , 1988. 
0^ 
Steve Russell 
Kathryn GM1 a i ^ ^ 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
On the ofaod> day of \ ^ytn^Otf* , 1988, personally appeared 
before me, STEVE RUSSELL and KATHRYN COLLARD, who signed the 
within AFFIDAVIT. In addition, Steve Russell and Kathryn Collard 
stated that they had read the document, were familiar with its 
contents, and that the facts, observations and opinions stated 
herein are true and correct to the best of their knowledge, 
information and belief. 
My Commission Expires: 
:-\ i-l )-fJ/J. 
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